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Abstract—Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems play a crucial role in national critical
infrastructures, and any failure may result in severe damages.
Initially SCADA networks were separated from other net-
works and used proprietary communications protocols that
were well known only to the device manufacturers. At that
time such isolation and obscurity ensured an acceptable se-
curity level. Nowadays, modern SCADA systems usually have
direct or indirect Internet connection, use open protocols and
commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and software. This trend
is also noticeable in the power industry. Present substation
automation systems (SASs) go beyond traditional SCADA
and employ many solutions derived from Information and
Communications Technology (ICT). As a result electric power
substations have become more vulnerable for cybersecurity
attacks and they need ICT security mechanisms adaptation.
This paper shows the SCADA honeypot that allows detecting
unauthorized or illicit traffic in SAS which communication
architecture is defined according to the IEC 61850 standard.
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1. Introduction
An electric power substation is a part of a critical infras-
tructure, an electrical grid, which delivers essential services
that many industry sectors and millions of individual con-
sumers depend on. Substations are used to distribute elec-
trical energy to consumers, transform voltage to different
levels, supervise and protect the distribution network. In
the modern substations theses functions are performed with
the support of a substation automation system (SAS).
SAS realizes common tasks of a Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and also provides addi-
tional features enhancing operation and maintenance effi-
ciency, e.g. alarm processing or substation integration [1].
Figure 1 presents a typical architecture of SAS that is di-
vided on three levels: station, bay and process. In the
station level there is a so-called Human Machine Interface
(HMI) used to control, supervise and monitor the substa-
tion, a workplace for engineering and configuration pur-
poses and interfaces for the remote communication, e.g.
with a control center. The bay level consists of control, pro-
tection and monitoring units of each bay and the process
level provides devices that directly interface the primary
substation equipment, i.e. smart sensors, actuators.
The devices in the bay and process levels are mostly intelli-
gent electronic devices (IEDs). IED is a device that imple-
ments particular function in a substation and has a micro-
processor and communication ports to be able to transmit
data and execute control commands. The examples of IEDs
are circuit breakers, voltage regulators, protection relays
and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). Big substa-
tions may have more than 100 bay level IEDs and a sim-
ilar amount of process level IEDs. Those IEDs are usu-
ally made by different vendors. To provide interoperability
between them the IEC 61850 standard defining common
communication architecture has been proposed.
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Fig. 1. A typical architecture of SAS.
In most countries the electrical grid contains typically very
few substations and a failure of one of them may have se-
vere consequences. Thus any single substation has to be
carefully protected. In particular, a special attention should
be devoted to the cybersecurity of SAS. The application of
Ethernet and other Information and Communications Tech-
nology (ICT) solutions, as indicated by IEC 61850, makes
SAS more exposed to cyberattacks.
A disclosure of cybersecurity incidents in SCADA systems
confirms that they are not free of security issues. The
prominent example of an attack on the SCADA system was
an attempt to sabotage Iran’s nuclear project by means of
a computer worm known as Stuxnet. Stuxnet was released
in 2009. Chen et al. in [2] show an overview of the
Stuxnet’s architecture. They point on the considerable ef-
fort needed to develop such a malware as well as on the
fact that the attack would not be possible to succeed with-
out insider knowledge and the support from a large team of
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experts. The Stuxnet targeted attacks are able to penetrate
into the isolated part of the SCADA system that were tradi-
tionally separated from the parts connected to the Internet.
Stuxnet contains modules that attack PLCs in the target
system and may cause physical damage to the equipment.
Fortunately, the awareness of cybersecurity threats is grow-
ing. According to the recent ICS-CERT report [3] in 2014
there were reported 232 incidents and 167 vulnerabilities
concerning SCADA systems. It is widely recognized that
the protection based on network isolation and an obscu-
rity of proprietary communication protocols is no longer
suitable for today’s such systems. From the analysis of
SCADA security standards presented in [4] it results that
the most important cyber countermeasures are authentica-
tion and cryptography. On the other hand the most fre-
quently mentioned threat in those standards is a malicious
code. The leading SAS vendors try to address these security
issues offering their products with additional security fea-
tures adapted from ICT systems such as firewalls, antivirus
software, advanced account management systems or intru-
sion detection and prevention systems supporting SCADA
signatures.
A useful security mechanism that is becoming more popular
in ICT systems are honeypots. As defined by Spitzner [5]
a honeypot is an information system resource whose value
lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. The
honeypot is a trap for the attackers. One of the honeypot’s
aim is to maintain the attacker’s interest and thus observe
the attack methods. This way previously unknown attack
methods can be revealed and analyzed to improve the sys-
tem security. Honeypots surely can help to better protect
the SCADA systems. Their application is considered in the
one of big research project concerning the cybersecurity of
critical infrastructures [6].
This paper presents the honeypot named SHaPe that is able
to emulate any IED conforming to the IEC 61850 standard.
SHaPe can be used to detect unauthorized or illicit traf-
fic in SAS, which communication architecture is defined
according to IEC 61850.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the related work concerning SCADA honey-
pots is discussed. In Section 3 the main principles of the
IEC 61850 standard are presented. Section 4 describes the
SHaPe honeypot. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the paper.
2. SCADA Honeypots
The literature mentions only few honeypots designed es-
pecially for SCADA systems. Each of them belongs to
one of the two traditional honeypot classes [7]: low-in-
teraction or high-interaction. A high-interaction honeypot
usually uses a real resource and let an attacker to inter-
act with it, e.g. log into the operating system. A low-in-
teraction honeypot operates by emulating a resource or
some part of it making an attacker convinced that he in-
teracts with the real resource. On the one hand the high-
interaction honeypot is able to induce and thus detect any
type of attack against the particular resource while the effi-
ciency of the low-interaction honeypot is limited by the
accuracy of the emulation. On the other hand the low-
interaction honeypot is usually easier to deploy and main-
tain and involves a lower risk of the honeypot to become
compromised.
One of the first initiatives concerning SCADA honeypots is
the SCADA Honeynet Project [8] that was started in 2004.
It aims to create a SCADA honeypot based on the low-
interaction honeypot Honeyd [9]. Honeyd simulates a num-
ber of network protocols such as HTTP, SMTP and FTP but
it can be extended to simulate other network protocols us-
ing simple scripts. The developers of the SCADA Honeynet
Project create a number of scripts emulating a PLC device
with HTTP, FTP, Telnet and Modbus services. They also
implement a Java applet that shows the status of a SCADA
device. The project being at the proof of concept stage has
not been developed since 2005.
Based on the SCADA Honeynet Project, Digital Bond [10]
develops a low-interaction SCADA honeypot that emulates
a popular PLC device with SNMP and all services provided
by the SCADA Honeynet Project honeypot. Moreover, Dig-
ital Bond proposes a security mechanism called SCADA
Honeywall. It uses IDS with special SCADA signatures to
detect known attacks and is able to stop the outbound traffic
from the compromised honeypots. The SCADA Honeywall
can be placed in front of either a low-interaction honeypot
like the one provided by Digital Bond or a high-interaction
honeypot using e.g. a real PLC.
Two different honeypot systems that have been used to
collect statistical data about the SCADA cyberattacks are
described in [11]. One system is a high-interaction honey-
pot that utilizes an actual PLC device and a physical server.
The PLC mimics a temperature controller in a factory and
has temperature, fan speed and light settings that can be
modified. The physical server that is connected with the
PLC operates as a HMI and hypothetically modifies the
PLC settings. The second system is a low-interaction hon-
eypot realized on the Amazon EC2 cloud Web service. One
Amazon EC2 instance is configured as a Web page emu-
lating the interface of a water pressure station. The another
Amazon EC2 instance connected with the first one simu-
lates PLC with DNP3 and Modbus services.
Another low-interaction SCADA honeypot emulating PLC
is presented in [6]. It implements three communication
protocols: Modbus, FTP and SNMP. Moreover it has a spe-
cial module for detecting probing activity at the remaining
TCP ports. The honeypot also provides additional features
such as filtering and aggregating the security events.
One of the latest SCADA honeypots is Conpot [12] on
which work began in 2013. Conpot is a low-interaction
honeypot that at the default configuration emulates Sie-
mens SIMATIC S7-200 PLC. It provides an implementa-
tion of Modbus and SNMP. The response times of emulated
services can be artificially delayed to mimic the behavior
of a system under constant load. Conpot can be deployed
with a custom HMI. It is an open source software that can
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be easily extended to emulate more complex SCADA sys-
tems. The project is actively developed under the auspice
of the Honeynet Project.
At the end, it should be noted that beside the aforemen-
tioned typical SCADA honeypots there are other more gen-
eral honeypot solutions that may be employed to protect
SCADA systems. For example, GhostUSB [13] is a low-
interaction honeypot that emulates a USB storage device.
Although it does not focus on the SCADA network proto-
cols it can be used in the SCADA system to detect malware
that propagates through USB devices, e.g. Stuxnet.
Concluding, the SCADA honeypots known in the literature
allow monitoring traffic involved with a HMI and typical
PLC devices. They focus on the traditional SCADA com-
munication protocols such as Modbus, SNMP, FTP and
HTTP. Taking into account that these protocols are not
included in the IEC 61850 standard none of the existing
SCADA honeypots is suitable for modern SASs compliant
with this standard.
3. Overview of IEC 61850
IEC 61850 is an international standard that defines layered
communication architecture for a SAS to provide an in-
teroperability between IEDs from different vendors. The
communication architecture is based on abstract informa-
tion and service models.
3.1. Information Model
The IEC 61850 information model is presented in [14]. It
is an object oriented model that specifies a set of basic
data types and data objects with strict naming conventions.
The data objects have a fixed hierarchical organization il-
lustrated in Fig. 2.
Physical device (Network address)
Logical device (Multifunction IED)
Logical node (XCBR)
Logical node (CSWI)
Data (Pos)
Data (Loc)
data attribute (stVal)
data attribute (q)
Fig. 2. The IEC 61850 information model.
At the top level of the hierarchy there is a physical device
that represents an IED connected to a SAS network. The
physical device is identified by its network address. It may
contain one or more logical devices. The logical devices are
used to form a group of some power system functions which
are defined as logical nodes. Typically, the physical device
has one logical device. However the possibility of having
multiple logical devices allows a single physical device to
act as a proxy or gateways for several IEDs.
The logical nodes contained in the logical device are the
key objects in IEC 61850 representing the smallest entities
of a SAS functionality used to exchange information be-
tween IEDs. A logical node is a named grouping of data
objects that are logically related to the specific function.
IEC 61850 defines more than 100 kinds of logical nodes
covering the most common applications of SAS equipment.
They are classified into 19 groups. The names of all logical
nodes from the same group begin with the same character.
For example the logical node XCBR that is used to model
switches with short circuit breaking capability belongs to
the Switchgear group which all logical nodes have names
beginning with the letter X.
The semantic of the logical node is defined by its data and
data attributes. Each data in the logical node has a unique
name determining its purpose. IEC 61850 specifies about
500 data types with different semantic definitions. A data
object may have multiple data attributes each one having
name and attribute type. Data attribute names are standard-
ized and carry specific semantic. For example the logical
node XCBR has several data objects, e.g. Pos that describe
a position of the circuit breaker, Loc indicating a switchover
between local and remote operations or OptCnt represent-
ing an operations counter. In turn, the data object Pos has
many data attributes, e.g. stVal representing a position of
the real breaker that is an enumerated type taking one of the
following values: intermediate-state, off, on or bad-state.
3.2. Service Model
The IEC 61850 service model is described in [15]. Like
the information model it is also object oriented. The ser-
vice model defines several classes with related services.
The class GenServer represents the external behavior of
a device. Each GenServer object contains one or more
instances of GenLogicalDeviceClass class. GenLogicalDe-
viceClass together with three other classes GenLogicalN-
odeClass, GenDataObjectClass and GenDataAttributeClass
represent the generic logical device, logical node, data and
data attribute, appropriately. GenDataAttributeClass has an
important property named functional constraint that indi-
cates what services can be performed on the particular data
attribute. For example value ST of the functional constraint
means that the data attribute represents status information
whose value may be read, but cannot be written.
In the service model there are also defined functional
constraint data and functional constraint data attribute.
The functional constraint data is an ordered collection of
data attributes of the data object having the same func-
tional constraint. The functional constraint data attribute is
a data attribute having the specific functional constraint.
An ordered set of elements being either a functional con-
39
Kamil Kołtyś and Robert Gajewski
straint data or a functional constraint data attribute is called
a data set and is represented by the DATA-SET class.
Data sets allow for more efficient information exchange
between IEDs.
The services related with the aforementioned classes are
the following:
• GenServerClass:
– GetServerDirectory: retrieves a list of all logi-
cal devices;
• GenLogicalDeviceClass:
– GetLogicalDeviceDirectory: retrieves a list of
all logical nodes;
• GenLogicalNodeClass:
– GetLogicalNodeDirectory: retrieves a list of all
instances of a given object class,
– GetAllDataValues: retrieves a list of all data at-
tribute values (optionally having a given func-
tional constraint) of all data objects;
• GenDataObjectClass:
– GetDataValues: retrieves a list of all data at-
tributes values,
– SetDataValues: sets a value of a given func-
tional constraint data or functional constraint
data attribute,
– GetDataDirectory: retrieves a list of all data
attribute names,
– GetDataDefinition: retrieve a list of all data at-
tribute definitions (names, types and functional
constraints);
• DATA-SET:
– GetDataSetValues: retrieves a list of the values
of all data attributes of the data set,
– SetDataSetValues: sets values of all data at-
tributes of the data set,
– CreateDataSet: creates a data set with a given
list of members being either a functional con-
straint data or a functional constraint data at-
tribute,
– DeleteDataSet: deletes a given data set,
– GetDataSetDirectory: retrieves a list of all data
set members.
IEC 61850 defines also other classes with different services
that are described in detail in [15]. All services are divided
on several categories. For example one category contains
services supporting the device self-description. Another
category is related with fast peer-to-peer exchange of sta-
tus information between IEDs and yet another involves the
control of an IED.
3.3. Mapping to MMS
The objects defined in the information and service models
are independent of any protocol stack. However to enable
real communication between IEDs these abstract objects
need to be implemented in a form that can practically op-
erate in a SAS network. IEC 61850 has established that
the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol
over TCP/IP should be used for this purpose. Nonetheless
another protocol can be chosen in the future to follow the
evolution in ICT.
MMS is a public ISO 9506 standard that specifies the ways
in which real time process data and supervisory control
information is transferred between networked devices and
computers. The key element of MMS is a Virtual Manufac-
turing Device (VMD) that models an MMS device (server)
from the viewpoint of an MMS client. The VMD defines
the objects (e.g. variables, domains) that are contained in
the MMS server, the services (e.g. read or write a vari-
able) a client can use to access or manipulate the objects
and the behavior of the server upon receipt of those service
requests. Tables 1 and 2 present the mapping of the IEC
61850 objects and services to MMS as defined in [16].
Table 1
The mapping of IEC 61850 objects to MMS objects
IEC 61850 object MMS object
GenServerClass VMD
GenLogicalDeviceClass Domain
GenLogicalNodeClass Named variable
GenDataObjectClass Named variable
DATA-SET Named variable list
Table 2
The mapping of IEC 61850 services to MMS services
IEC 61850 service MMS service
GetServerDirectory GetNameList
GetLogicalDevice-
Directory
GetNameList
GetLogicalNodeDirectory GetNameList
GetAllDataValues Read
GetDataValues Read
SetDataValues Write
GetDataDirectory
GetVariableAccess-
Attributes
GetDataDefinition
GetVariableAccess-
Attributes
GetDataSetValues Read
SetDataSetValues Write
CreateDataSet DefineNamedVariableList
DeleteDataSet DeleteNamedVariableList
GetDataSetDirectory
GetNamedVariableList-
Attributes
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According to ISO 9506 a VMD and thus every instance
of GenServerClass must also implement the following
services:
• Initiate – establishes an application association, i.e.
an agreement between the MMS client and the MMS
server governing their communication,
• Conclude – terminates an existing application asso-
ciation in a graceful manner,
• Abort – terminates an existing application association
in an ungraceful manner that may result in the loss
of data,
• Reject – notifies about reception of an unsupported
service request,
• Cancel – cancel an outstanding MMS service request,
• Identify – obtains information and status about the
MMS server.
MMS services are grouped into two categories: the ser-
vices requiring confirmation (so-called confirmed services)
and the services that do not require such a confirmation
(so-called unconfirmed services). The confirmed services
contain an invocation identifier that identifies the service
instance.
3.4. Configuration Description Language
Proper substation operation requires appropriate configu-
ration of all its IEDs. IEC 61850 provides a Substation
Configuration Language (SCL) that allows to describe the
substation topology, the communication system, e.g. how
IEDs are connected to networks and subnetworks, how data
objects are grouped into data sets. SCL also allows to de-
scribe the particular IED capabilities in terms of logical
nodes and the relation between substation structure and the
SAS functions represented by the logical nodes. The SCL
is based on XML. Its specification is given in [17].
A configuration process of substation involves many SCL
files to be created. The structure and functions of the
substation is defined in a System Specification Descrip-
tion (SSD) file that for example may contain the required
types of logical nodes and data. The configuration of
all IEDs with the communication section and the sub-
station description is included in a System Configuration
Description (SCD) file. Each IED to be compatible with
IEC 61850 must have an IED Capability Description
(ICD) file describing its functional and engineering capa-
bilities or an Instantiated IED Description (IID) file includ-
ing its project specific configuration. Moreover, it must be
able to use the SCD file to set its communication con-
figuration that is saved as a Configured IED Description
(CID) file.
4. SHaPe
The IEC 61850 standard was published in 2004 and since
then it has gained popularity among electric utilities and
power system authorities in many countries. It can be taken
for granted that more and more substations will be up-
graded to conform the IEC 61850 standard. Thus a future
SCADA honeypot to be useful in the electric power indus-
try must support the communication protocols specified in
IEC 61850.
4.1. General Concept
SHaPe is a low-interaction honeypot that is able to emulate
any IED compliant with IEC 61850.
The low-interaction approach allows to achieve several im-
portant goals. Firstly, SHaPe can be easily configured to
emulate different devices. What is needed is to provide an
ICD or IID file with the requested IED configuration. The
SCL file can be prepared using some IEC 61850 configu-
ration tool or simply obtained from the existing IED if the
similar one has to be emulated by SHaPe.
Secondly, SHaPe does not require any specialized equip-
ment or much computing resources. A typical personal
computer may run several instances of SHaPe. Each in-
stance can listen on multiple IP addresses. Taking into
account that a traffic coming into honeypots is rather low
one machine should be enough to deploy a farm of SHaPe
honeypots emulating many IEDs of different types.
Finally, SHaPe as a low-interaction honeypot involves lower
risk of being compromised by an attacker than a high-
interaction solution [18].
4.2. Detection Scope
SHaPe emulates IED behaviour that is involved with
the MMS communication over TCP/IP connection. The
generic substation events based on GOOSE or transmission
of sampled values that according to IEC 61850 are mapped
to other protocol stacks are not handled by the SHaPe
honeypot. Nonetheless all IEC 61850 services mapped to
MMS are supported and executed by SHaPe. If a service
creates, modifies or deletes some object the state of the
emulated IED will be accordingly updated.
SHaPe allows for detecting many important events that may
appear during the communication with the emulated IED.
These events are the following:
• an establishment of a TCP connection,
• a termination of a TCP connection,
• an establishment of an MMS application association
(Initiate service),
• a graceful termination of an MMS application asso-
ciation (Conclude service),
• a receipt of a Reject service request,
• a receipt of an Identify service request,
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• a receipt of a GetNameList service request,
• a receipt of a Read service request,
• a receipt of a Write service request,
• a receipt of a GetVariableAccessAttributes service
request,
• a receipt of a DefineNamedVariableList service re-
quest,
• a receipt of a DeleteNamedVariableList service re-
quest,
• a receipt of a GetNamedVariableListAttributes ser-
vice request,
• a receipt of an unknown MMS request before estab-
lishing an MMS application association,
• a receipt of an unrecognized MMS request after es-
tablishing an MMS application association.
Note that all IEC 61850 services are captured by SHaPe in
terms of appropriate MMS services. Moreover, SHaPe de-
tects the establishment and termination of every TCP con-
nection and the receipt of MMS services related to VMD
except Abort and Cancel services.
4.3. Monitoring Multiple Network Addresses
One instance of SHaPe can emulate an IED of a particu-
lar type. However SHaPe is able to run many copies of
the emulated IED each one having assigned different IP
address. In this way SHaPe allows for easily increasing
the number of monitored IP addresses and thus the attack
surface involved with the particular type of IED.
For each running copy of IED SHaPe maintains a sepa-
rate state, i.e. the values of all data attributes in all log-
ical nodes. The IED state can be modified by some IEC
61850 services, e.g. SetDataValues or SetDataSetValues.
All MMS clients connected with the same IED copy see
the modifications made by any of them. SHaPe keeps the
modified state until there is no MMS client connection over
a predefined period of time. After this idle time the IED
state is restored to the initial one.
4.4. Implementation
SHaPe has been implemented as a module of Dionaea [19],
which is a general purpose low-interaction honeypot run-
ning on the Linux platform. Dionaea has several modules
that emulate different services prevalent in typical computer
networks, e.g. HTTP, FTP, SMB. None of these modules
can emulate a typical SCADA device. SHaPe is the first
Dionaea module that is designed for SCADA networks.
Dionaea provides two useful mechanisms for their modules:
a communication mechanism handling TCP connections
and a logging mechanism that registers security events.
Thanks to the communication mechanism SHaPe does not
have to operate directly on the TCP sockets as it can handle
appropriate events related to the transport communication
layer, e.g. establishing a new TCP connection, terminating
a TCP connection or receiving data. The events concern-
ing the establishment or termination of a TCP connection
are automatically forwarded to the Dionaea logging mech-
anism. For each establishment of a TCP connection the
following information is registered: the TCP connection
identifier, the timestamp, the source IP address, the source
port, the destination IP address and the destination port.
An event of the termination of a TCP connection contains
the identifier of the TCP connection and the timestamp.
The Dionaea logging mechanism saves event information in
a log file and optionally sends it to a specific XMPP server.
SHaPe uses this logging mechanism to register events re-
lated to MMS protocol layer in the same way as the TCP
layer events are registered. For each MMS protocol layer
event the following information is provided: the identifier
of TCP connection within the event has occurred, the event
timestamp, the type and body of the MMS request in which
the event has been detected. The type of MMS request indi-
cates one of the unconfirmed services (Initiate, Conclude or
Reject) or that a requested service is confirmed. In the latter
case SHaPe registers additional information – the subtype
corresponding to the particular confirmed MMS service and
the invocation identifier of the service instance.
To handle MMS requests SHaPe utilizes library li-
biec61850 [20] that for integration purposes has been
slightly modified.
Both Dionaea and libiec61850 are an open source software.
Also SHaPe is publicly available under GNU GPL at the
SHaPe project website [21].
5. Summary
In this paper the honeypot named SHaPe is proposed.
SHaPe opposed to other SCADA honeypots supports the
IEC 61850 standard. Thus it can be used to protect a mod-
ern SAS conforming to this standard.
SHaPe can be easily configured to emulate any IED by pro-
viding an appropriate SCL file. One SHaPe instance may
listen on multiple IP addresses maintaining many copies
of the particular IED. Several SHaPe honeypots allow to
create a network of different IED decoys significantly in-
creasing the chance of detecting an unauthorized or illicit
traffic in SAS.
SHaPe has been implemented as a module of Dionaea
which is a general purpose low-interaction honeypot. To
handle MMS requests according to IEC 61850 SHaPe uses
library libiec61850. SHaPe along with Dionaea and li-
biec61850 is an open source software publicly available
under GNU GPL.
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